HTTP Redirect/POST binding

a. Stolen Assertion

Threat: If an eavesdropper can copy the real user’s SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) response and included assertions, then the eavesdropper could construct an appropriate POST body and be able to impersonate the user at the destination site.

Countermeasures: Confidentiality MUST be provided whenever a response is communicated between a site and the user’s browser. This provides protection against an eavesdropper obtaining a real user’s SAML response and assertions.

If an eavesdropper defeats the measures used to ensure confidentiality, additional countermeasures are available:

  1. The Identity Provider and Service Provider sites SHOULD make some reasonable effort to ensure that clock settings at both sites differ by at most a few minutes. Many forms of time synchronization service are available, both over the Internet and from proprietary sources.
  2. When a non-SSO SAML profile uses the POST binding it must ensure that the receiver can perform timely subject confirmation. To this end, a SAML authentication assertion for the principal MUST be included in the POSTed form response.
  3. Values for NotBefore and NotOnOrAfter attributes of SSO (Single Sign-On) assertions SHOULD have the shortest possible validity period consistent with successful communication of the assertion from Identity Provider to Service Provider site. This is typically on the order of a few minutes. This ensures that a stolen assertion can only be used successfully within a small time window.
  4. The Service Provider site MUST check the validity period of all assertions obtained from the Identity Provider site and reject expired assertions. A Service Provider site MAY choose to implement a stricter test of validity for SSO assertions, such as requiring the assertion’s IssueInstant or AuthnInstant attribute value to be within a few minutes of the time at which the assertion is received at the Service Provider site.
  5. If a received authentication statement includes a <saml:SubjectLocality> element with the IP address of the user, the Service Provider site MAY check the browser IP address against the IP address contained in the authentication statement.

b. Man In the Middle Attack

Threat: Since the Service Provider site obtains bearer SAML assertions from the user by means of an HTML form, a malicious site could impersonate the user at some new Service Provider site. The new Service Provider site would believe the malicious site to be the subject of the assertion.

Countermeasures: The Service Provider site MUST check the Recipient attribute of the SAML response to ensure that its value matches the https://<assertion consumer host name and path>. As the response is digitally signed, the Recipient value cannot be altered by the malicious site.

c. Forged Assertion

Threat: A malicious user, or the browser user, could forge or alter a SAML assertion.

Countermeasures: The browser/POST profile requires the SAML response carrying SAML assertions to be signed, thus providing both message integrity and authentication. The Service Provider site MUST verify the signature and authenticate the issuer.

d. Browser State Exposure

Threat: The browser/POST profile involves uploading of assertions from the web browser to a Service Provider site. This information is available as part of the web browser state and is usually stored in persistent storage on the user system in a completely unsecured fashion. The threat here is that the assertion may be “reused” at some later point in time.

Countermeasures: Assertions communicated using this profile must always have short lifetimes and should have a <OneTimeUse> SAML assertion <Conditions> element. Service Provider sites are expected to ensure that the assertions are not re-used.

e. Replay

Threat: Replay attacks amount to re-submission of the form in order to access a protected resource fraudulently.

Countermeasures: The profile mandates that the assertions transferred have the one-use property at the Service Provider site, preventing replay attacks from succeeding.

f. Modification or Exposure of state information

Threat: Relay state tampering or fabrication, Some of the messages may carry a <RelayState> element, which is recommended to be integrity protected by the producer and optionally confidentiality- protected. If these practices are not followed, an adversary could trigger unwanted side effects. In addition, by not confidentiality-protecting the value of this element, a legitimate system entity could inadvertently expose information to the identity provider or a passive attacker.

Countermeasure: Follow the recommended practice of confidentiality and integrity protecting the RelayState data. Note: Because the value of this element is both produced and consumed by the same system entity, symmetric cryptographic primitives could be utilized.

Tags : , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

If you enjoyed this post, please consider to leave a comment or subscribe to the feed and get future articles delivered to your feed reader.

Leave Comment